We show that range convexity of beliefs, a 'technical' condition that appears naturally in axiomatizations of preferences in a Savage-like framework, imposes some unexpected restrictions when modelling ambiguity averse preferences. That is, when it is added to a mild condition, range convexity makes the preferences collapse to subjective expected utility as soon as they satisfy structural conditions that are typically used to characterize ambiguity aversion.
Introduction
The mathematical representations of preferences that we obtain in decisiontheoretic models typically enjoy both 'empirically relevant' and 'technical' properties. Separability is an obvious example of a property belonging to the former group, while continuity of preferences, or monotone continuity for probabilities belong to the latter. 1 Technical properties are thus named because, taken in isolation, they have small or null empirical content. But it is not correct to then infer that they are harmless. For, when joined with empirically relevant properties, technical conditions may substantially alter their empirical content. For instance, it is well known that for probabilities, monotone continuity modifies the empirical content of finite additivity, as most eloquently stressed by de Finetti [5] and Savage [19] . Analogously, Krantz et al. [14, Sect. 9 .1] and Wakker [21] observe that continuity adds significant empirical content to (coordinatewise) separability in problems of additive conjoint measurement. Another technical property that is commonly used is 'range convexity' (see Section 1 for a definition) of the function representing the decision maker's beliefs, that we call her willingness to bet. Such property follows naturally in axiomatizations that rely on Savage's [19] rich state space construction. In this paper we show that also range convexity is less harmless than usually thought.
We argue that range convexity of the willingness to bet imposes surprisingly strong restrictions for preferences which reflect ambiguity aversion, the attitude displayed by the subjects in the famous thought experiment of Ellsberg [7] (and in many others that followed). Roughly, we show that if a decision maker's willingness to bet satisfies a range convexity assumption and a very mild condition then if her preferences are ambiguity averse (in the sense of Ghirardato and Marinacci [8] ), they are very close to satisfying the subjective expected utility (SEU) model. Indeed, if her willingness to bet is also convex (a condition typically associated with ambiguity aversion), then her preferences do satisfy SEU. The mild condition -which we show to be compatible with the presence of substantial ambiguity aversion -is the following: There exists one nontrivial event A such that for every event B which is less (resp. equally) 'likely' than A, the complement B c is more (resp. equally) 'likely' than A c . That is, when betting on that specific event, the decision maker behaves as if she had probabilistic beliefs, but she is otherwise unconstrained.
These results hold for a very general class of preferences (the biseparable preferences introduced in Ghirardato and Marinacci [10] ) which includes the two most popular decision models with ambiguity aversion, the Choquet expected utility (CEU) model of Schmeidler [20] , and the maxmin expected utility (MEU) model of Gilboa and Schmeidler [13] . In particular, they apply to the axiomatizations of CEU preferences in a purely subjective framework of Sarin and Wakker [17] and Gilboa [11] , which describe decision makers whose willingness to bet satisfies some range convexity conditions.
To show that range convexity is the driving force behind the mentioned results, we also look at ambiguity averse preferences in the setting of Anscombe and Aumann [1] , as exemplified by the models of Schmeidler [20] and Gilboa and Schmeidler [13] . We show that similar results can be proved, but only by making the mild condition in the previous results much stronger and much less plausible.
The conclusion that we draw from this exercise is that one should exert caution in assuming range convexity of beliefs, as the latter adds substantial empirical content to seemingly weak (empirically relevant) conditions. For the specific purpose of modelling ambiguity averse decision makers, our results show that range convexity may deprive CEU and MEU preferences of their predictive edge over SEU. 2 The paper proceeds as follows: Section 1 introduces the required definitions and a key result. In Section 2 we warm up by showing a straightforward consequence of range convexity for CEU preferences like those described by Sarin and Wakker [17] . Sections 3 and 4 contain the main results in a Savage setting. Section 5 concludes by showing that the results lose their bite in the AnscombeAumann setting. The Appendices contain some basic definitions (capacities and Choquet integrals), a review of the CEU and MEU models, and all the proofs.
Preliminaries and notation

Decision settings
The two decision settings that we use in the paper are the one developed by Anscombe and Aumann [1] and the one developed by Savage [19] .
In the simpler Savage setting, the objects of choice are 'acts', delivering a consequence for each state of the world. More precisely, there is a state space (S , Σ), where Σ is a σ-algebra of subsets of S , and a set X of consequences (alternatively, prizes), equipped with a σ-algebra U containing all the singletons. The set of acts F is the class of all the simple (i.e., finite-ranged) measurable functions from S into X . As customary, we abuse notation and identify x ∈ X with the constant act yielding x for every state s ∈ S .
In the Anscombe-Aumann setting, the objects of choice are also statecontingent acts, but the consequences are (objective) lotteries on the set of prizes X . More precisely, let P be the set of all the simple probability measures on the σ-algebra U . 3 The set of acts is the set F of all the simple measurable functions from S into P . As customary, we abuse notation and identify the elements x ∈ X with the degenerate lotteries in P . Similarly, we use p to denote the constant act mapping every state s ∈ S into the same point p ∈ P . 4 For any pair p, q ∈ P (in particular a pair of sure prizes in X ) and an event A ∈ Σ, we denote by p A q the binary act which yields p if A obtains and q otherwise, and by p α q the lottery that yields p with probability α and q with probability (1 − α). 2 Clearly, the axiomatic models which build instead on a rich outcome space -e.g., the CEU models of Wakker [22] , Nakamura [15] and Chew and Karni [3] , the MEU model of CasadesusMasanell et al. [2] , or the mentioned models in the Anscombe-Aumann setting -do not have such problem. 3 Throughout the paper, probability measures are finitely additive capacities (see Appendix A for a definition). 4 We stick here to the traditional interpretation of the elements of P as lotteries. Of course the Anscombe-Aumann framework is consistent with any consequence space having a vector space structure (for instance, it could be a convex subset of R n , where we interpret consequences as bundles of goods).
Preference models
In general, we assume that a decision maker's choice behavior is described by a weak order (a complete and transitive binary relation) on F , and and ∼ respectively denote the asymmetric and symmetric component of . A weak order is nontrivial if there are x , x ∈ X such that x x . For any nontrivial weak order , we say that an event A ∈ Σ is essential for if x x A x x , for some x x .
To define the basic preference model that we use in the paper we need to introduce some terminology and notation. As customary, a representation of is a function V :
for all s ∈ S . We can now define:
Definition 1 Let be a binary relation on F . We say that a representation V : F → R of is canonical if it is monotonic and there is a set-function ρ
for all x ∈ X , for all consequences x y and all A ∈ Σ we have:
A relation on F is called a biseparable ordering if it admits a canonical representation that, if has at least one essential event, is unique up to a positive affine transformation.
Given a biseparable ordering , we call u its canonical utility index. Suppose that is also nontrivial. It is easy to see that ρ V is independent of the specific canonical representation V -so that we can denote it ρ -and that because of the monotonicity of V , ρ is a capacity (see Appendix A for a definition). Moreover, for any x , x ∈ X such that x x , define the 'likelihood' relation * on Σ as follows: 5 For every A, B ∈ Σ, let
That is, A * B iff the decision maker prefers to bet 'on' A rather than to bet 'on' B (with the same payoffs). By definition, A * B iff ρ(A) ≥ ρ(B ). Therefore, we call ρ the decision maker's willingness to bet.
In the Anscombe-Aumann setting, we use a slightly smaller class of preferences, as we assume that they are also linear on the set P of the lotteries on the final prizes X . 
Since it basically only restricts the decision maker's choices among bets (binary acts), the class of biseparable (or c-linear biseparable) orderings is very large, and it contains most of the decision models with state-independent utility that have been studied by decision theorists. 6 In particular, it contains CEU (hence SEU) and α-MEU orderings. 7 
Ambiguity aversion
In [8] , we propose a behavioral notion of absolute ambiguity aversion, and we show that for biseparable preferences it is quite generally characterized as follows. Let ∆ be the set of all the probability measures on (S , Σ) and
A biseparable ordering is ambiguity averse iff D ( ) / = ∅. In light of this result, here we define ambiguity aversion as having D ( ) / = ∅. In particular, this implies that a CEU ordering with capacity ρ is ambiguity averse if and only if Core(ρ) / = ∅, i.e., ρ is balanced. In fact, in such a case D ( ) = Core(ρ). In the case of a MEU ordering with set of priors C , D ( ) = C . Hence all MEU orderings are ambiguity averse, whereas all 0-MEU orderings are ambiguity loving. Schmeidler [20] proposes a stronger property of ambiguity aversion in the Anscombe-Aumann setting. In the CEU case such property is characterized by convexity of ρ. MEU (resp. 0-MEU) orderings are ambiguity averse (resp. loving) also in this stronger sense.
In [8] , we also propose a behavioral notion of unambiguous event, and we show that the set of unambiguous events of an ambiguity averse (or loving) biseparable preference is characterized as follows: A is unambiguous for a preference with willingness to bet ρ iff
Again, this result applies in particular to CEU and MEU preferences, where ρ respectively represents the beliefs and lower envelope of the set of priors (see Eq. (17) in App. B). 8 In particular, when Λ = Σ we just say that ρ is convex-ranged. 
Range convexity and a useful result
It is easy to see that for every 0
The following result about the uniqueness of probability measures in the presence of range convexity is proved in [9, Theorem 1], where we study its consequences for SEU preferences.
Lemma 1 Let P 1 and P 2 be probability measures on (S , Σ), with P 1 convexranged. Suppose that there is A ∈ Σ such that P i (A) ∈ (0, 1) for i = 1, 2, and such that for all B ∈ Σ,
Then P 1 = P 2 .
Prologue: Complement symmetry
Consider a nontrivial CEU ordering on F . As mentioned above, the capacity ρ is a numerical representation of the decision maker's 'likelihood' relation * on Σ. Consider now the alternative 'likelihood' relation * defined by
That is, A * B if the decision maker prefers betting 'against' B to betting against A. If ρ is a probability measure (i.e., is a SEU preference), then * = * . That is, one obtains an identical likelihood relation if instead of considering bets 'on' events, one considers bets 'against' events. However, this is not necessarily true if ρ is not additive (as observed, for example, by Gilboa [12] ).
In a comment on Sarin and Wakker [17] 's axiomatization of CEU orderings in a Savage setting, Nehring [16] argues that Sarin and Wakker's interpretation of one of their axioms (P4) is compelling only for those CEU preferences for which * = * . This is tantamount to imposing the following condition, that he dubs 'complement symmetry' (CS): For all A, B ∈ Σ,
Nehring claims ( This claim is not generally true: The following example shows that there are CEU preferences which are complement symmetric, but do not induce a symmetric capacity.
Example 1.
On an arbitrary state space (S , Σ), given a probability measure P on Σ and constant 0 < k < 1, consider the capacityρ defined as follows: For every
A CEU ordering represented byρ is complement symmetric, butρ is not symmetric. For another example, consider the rank-dependent EU (RDEU) orderings, CEU orderings whose capacity ρ is a 'distortion' of a probability measure (that is, ρ = g(P ) for g : [0, 1] → [0, 1] strictly increasing and such that g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1). Any RDEU ordering is easily seen to be complement symmetric. However, its capacity ρ may not be symmetric (one only needs that there be some
However, Nehring's claim that CS implies symmetry is true for a subset of the CEU orderings, to which the orderings axiomatized by Sarin and Wakker [17] also belong: The ones whose capacity is convex-ranged and symmetric on a class of events containing S and closed w.r.t. complements. 10 Indeed, we will presently show that for CEU orderings in this class, Nehring's claim can be considerably strengthened: a preference is ambiguity averse and satisfies a weakening of CS only if it is SEU. The weaker version of CS is the following:
Definition 3 We say that a nontrivial weak order satisfies weak complement symmetry (WCS) if for every A, B ∈ Σ,
Condition (8) It will be observed that the capacityρ used in the example above is not convex-ranged. Also, we remark a corollary to the proposition: Consider a RDEU preference satisfying the assumptions of Proposition 1, whose willingness to bet is represented by a distortion ρ = g(P ), as described above. Then is ambiguity averse in the sense of [8] if and only if it is a SEU ordering. This is due to the fact that any such satisfies CS, as observed above. To be fair, the condition that ρ is convex-ranged and symmetric on a class Λ implies that g must satisfy the following condition for all α ∈ (0, 1): g(α) = 1−g(1−α) (i.e., g is symmetric around the diagonal). This seems to us quite restrictive.
However, it is possible to use Lemma 1 to show the following more interesting result about RDEU orderings. Suppose that a capacity ρ = g(P ) for a convexranged P , and that there is just one α ∈ (0, 1) such that g(α) = 1 − g(1 − α). Then if ρ is exact (that is, it is equal to the lower envelope of its core), it is equal to P . This implies that any RDEU ordering whose g and P (and g(P )) satisfy the conditions listed above is a SEU ordering.
A complement symmetric event
An obvious objection to Proposition 1 is that CS is too strong a property to require of ambiguity averse preferences. Indeed, requiring complement symmetry robs them of one of their most interesting features (see also Sarin and Wakker [18] ). In fact, it is quite clear that the presence of ambiguity might make one's evaluation of bets on different events depend on whether one stands to win or to lose contingently on those events: If the decision maker perceives more ambiguity about event B than about A, he might well prefer the bet on A over the bet on B , and the bet on A c over the bet on B c . This is exactly what complement symmetry rules out. 11 Because of point (i ) of Proposition 1, under range convexity, WCS is subject to similar criticism.
However, we now show that, thanks to Lemma 1, in the presence of range convexity it is possible to obtain similarly strong conclusions even if CS only holds for a single event. The following definition formalizes our main requirement.
Definition 4
Given a nontrivial weak order , we say that an event A ∈ Σ is complement symmetric if for all B ∈ Σ and some x x ,
In words, an essential event A is complement symmetric if the decision maker prefers (resp. is indifferent) betting 'on' A over betting 'on' B , then he prefers (resp. is indifferent) betting 'against' B over betting 'against' A. We assume that our preference has (at least) one essential and complement symmetric event. This is significantly weaker than CS, that requires that all events be complement symmetric. Moreover, notice that here the symmetry of betting behavior is required only 'below' A. That is, we do not require that B * A imply A c * B c . It is important to stress that we do not attach any normative value to the existence of an essential complement symmetric event. Our perspective is completely positive. Indeed, we remark that this condition is extremely weak, and, differently from CS, it is compatible with high levels of ambiguity aversion. The following example illustrates this point:
Example 2 Consider the classical Ellsberg 3-color urn, containing 30 red balls and 60 blue or yellow balls. The state space of the possible ball extractions is S = {r, b, y}. Consider a CEU decision maker with beliefs represented by the capacity ρ defined as follows: ρ(r) = 1/3, ρ(b, y) = 2/3, ρ(b) = ρ(y) = 1/6 and ρ(r, y) = ρ(r, b) = 1/2. This is clearly an ambiguity averse decision maker, displaying the preferences traditionally observed in this problem. If we consider A = {b} and B = ∅ we see that his preference does not satisfy CS. However, A = {r} is an essential complement symmetric event for these beliefs.
To acquire anyway a better feel of the interpretation of this assumption, observe that the capacity ρ(A) can be conceptually seen as the synthesis of two different types of considerations: One is a 'pure likelihood' judgement on the plausibility of A happening, the other is an 'ambiguity' factor, that modifies the pure likelihood judgement to take into account the ambiguity perceived about A. Assuming, as it seems reasonable, that the ambiguity perceived about A is the same as that perceived about A c , the number ρ(A)/ρ(A c ) is then an estimate of the 'pure' odds associated with A. Then, A is an essential complement symmetric
That is, all the events which are as likely as A have identical 'pure' odds, and all those which are less likely than A have lower 'pure' odds.
In the main result of this section we show that under the assumptions on the willingness to bet ρ used in Proposition 1, additivity of the willingness to bet ρ almost follows from the assumption made above.
Theorem 1 Consider a nontrivial biseparable ordering whose willingness to bet ρ is convex-ranged and symmetric on a class Λ ⊆ Σ containing S and closed under complementation. Then: (i) If has an essential complement symmetric event, then Core(ρ) is at most a singleton; (ii) has an essential complement symmetric event and ρ is exact if and only if ρ is additive.
Thus, when there is an essential complement symmetric event, the willingness to bet can at most have one probability measure P in its core. Moreover, if it is also exact, then ρ must coincide with such P (which exists, since exact capacities are balanced). In particular, this will be the case if, as is often assumed, ρ is convex.
Theorem 1 does not yet enable us to conclude that the preference in question must be a SEU ordering. Indeed, in [8] we show that there are biseparable orderings whose ρ is a probability measure which are strictly ambiguity averse, hence non-SEU. However, more can be said if we limit our attention to a subset of the biseparable preferences that contains both the CEU and MEU models as particular cases. These are the biseparable such that their canonical representation V satisfies the following condition: For all f ∈ F ,
where ρ is the willingness to bet associated with V , and the integral is taken in the sense of Choquet. We then obtain:
Corollary 1 Consider a relation satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 1. Suppose moreover that is ambiguity averse, it satisfies (11) and it has an exact ρ. Then has an essential complement symmetric event if and only if has a SEU representation.
Remark 2. The assumptions that is ambiguity averse and it satisfies (11) are only used in the corollary to guarantee that is SEU whenever ρ is additive. Thus, the same result can be obtained for any class of biseparable orderings with the latter property.
We now apply this corollary to CEU and MEU preferences to obtain the following immediate:
Corollary 2 Consider a nontrivial biseparable ordering whose willingness to bet ρ is convex-ranged and symmetric on a class Λ ⊆ Σ containing S and closed under complementation. Then the following hold: (i) is a CEU ordering with exact ρ and an essential complement symmetric event if and only if is a SEU ordering; (ii) is a MEU ordering with an essential complement symmetric event if and only if is a SEU ordering.
This result shows that the range convexity of ρ, rather than CS or WCS, is what drives the strong conclusions we obtain in Theorem 1. Even in the presence of the significantly milder condition that there be a single essential complement symmetric event, range convexity reduces MEU preferences to SEU, and it almost reduces ambiguity averse CEU preferences to SEU (the exception being those ambiguity averse CEU preferences whose ρ is balanced but not exact).
In particular, Corollary 2 allows us to reformulate Nehring's critique of the axiomatization of Sarin and Wakker [17] as follows: The range convexity of beliefs that plays such a crucial role in that axiomatization makes the scope of the preferences they describe fairly narrow. Differently from Nehring, what motivates this point is not the fact that the interpretation of the axioms may implicitly be based on the validity of CS. Rather, our motivation is the observation that the existence of a complement symmetric event is a very mild condition which is likely to be often satisfied. Clearly, a similar critique could be made of an axiomatization of MEU preferences constructed along the same lines as Sarin and Wakker [17] , since that would likely yield a ρ satisfying the conditions of Corollary 2.
Without symmetry on Λ
One could of course raise doubts about the role that the symmetry of ρ on Λ plays in the results in the previous section. For example, it is material to obtaining the symmetry of ρ on Σ in Theorem 1. We now show that similar conclusions can be obtained even if there is no class Λ on which ρ is symmetric.
We reinforce range convexity by assuming that it holds over the whole Σ, and we add the requirement that the essential complement symmetric event A be also unambiguous (i.e., A ∈ Π( )). For example, event A in Example 2 also satisfies this stronger condition. We then obtain the following result for the CEU case:
Proposition 2 Consider a nontrivial CEU ordering whose willingness to bet ρ is convex and convex-ranged. Then has an essential, complement symmetric and unambiguous event if and only if is a SEU ordering.
This result shows that the CEU axiomatization of Gilboa [11] has a similar limitation as Sarin and Wakker's: Because of the range convexity of ρ, the existence of an unambiguous complement symmetric event and a little structure on the preferences, are tantamount to satisfying all Savage's axioms.
Similarly to what we did for earlier results, Proposition 2 can be proved more generally for biseparable orderings; we have only stated the CEU version because we deem it to be the most interesting one. (For instance, the condition that ρ is convex-ranged on Σ seems too strong for MEU preferences, where ρ = P .) However, there is another result that symmetrically seems to be more interesting for α-MEU orderings than for CEU orderings, even though it could also be generalized to biseparable preferences (assuming ambiguity aversion and using D ( ) in place of C ).
Proposition 3 Consider a nontrivial α-MEU ordering such that α /
= 1/2 and at least one P ∈ C is convex-ranged. Then has an essential, complement symmetric and unambiguous event if and only if is a SEU ordering.
Remark 3. The proposition is false if α = 1/2. In fact, it is easy to see that for any such preference Π( ) = Σ, and every event is complement symmetric. Hence, the assumptions have no bite. This does imply that a 1/2-MEU preference is ambiguity averse iff ρ is additive (see Lemma 2 in Appendix C). However, ρ could be additive without being SEU.
While no axiomatizations of MEU (or α-MEU) preferences with this range convexity property are available, it seems fairly likely that any axiomatization which uses a rich-state framework would deliver at least one P ∈ C convexranged. Proposition 3 shows that such axiomatization would be narrowly more general than Savage's.
Range convexity and the Anscombe-Aumann setting
In the Anscombe-Aumann setting, the range convexity of the decision maker's beliefs is implicitly built into the framework, by assuming that all the simple lotteries on X are available. It is therefore natural to conjecture that results similar to those presented in the previous two sections could be proved for clinear biseparable preferences, in particular for the CEU and MEU models of Schmeidler [20] and Gilboa and Schmeidler [13] . 12 However, that conjecture is easily disproved by looking at the following extension of Example 2.
Example 3. Consider the Ellsberg urn described in Example 2, and imagine that an independent randomizing device (a 'roulette wheel') is available, which can be used to make simple lotteries on X as payoffs. In this Anscombe-Aumann setting, consider a CEU ordering whose beliefs are given by the capacity ρ in Example 2. As explained there, does have an essential complement symmetric event, and ρ is convex. But is clearly not a SEU ordering.
The reason for the failure of Proposition 2 in this example is that the capacity ρ is not convex-ranged on Σ. One could of course argue that the decision maker's beliefs in an Anscombe-Aumann setting are really described by ρ and by her beliefs on the behavior of the randomizing device, i.e., on the 'roulette wheel' events. An 'event' is then a product of an event in Σ and an event on the roulette wheel. However, in such a case the notion of complement symmetric event becomes more demanding than in Savage's setting. At the very least, we need an 'event' which satisfies the following condition:
Definition 5 Given a nontrivial weak order in an Anscombe-Aumann setting, we say that it has an essential fully complement symmetric 'event' if there are x , x ∈ X such that x x and α ∈ (0, 1) such that, for every B ∈ Σ and every β, β ∈ [0, 1],
The two conditions correspond to Eq. (10) in Definition 4, and they say that there is some α such that all 'events' of probability α have complements which are equally likely. Since the set of 'events' is very rich, they are significantly more demanding than requiring the existence of an A ∈ Σ which satisfies (10). For example, the preference in Example 3 does not have an essential fully complement symmetric 'event'. 13 However, we do have the following result:
Proposition 4 Consider a nontrivial c-linear biseparable ordering (in an Anscombe-Aumann setting) with willingness to bet ρ. Then has an essential fully complement symmetric 'event' if and only if ρ is symmetric. If, in addition, ρ is balanced, then it is additive.
Proceeding as in Section 3, we immediately obtain the consequences for CEU and MEU orderings:
Corollary 3 Consider a nontrivial c-linear biseparable ordering with whose willingness to bet ρ. Then the following hold: (i) is an ambiguity averse CEU ordering with an essential fully complement symmetric 'event' if and only if is a SEU ordering; (ii) is a MEU ordering with an essential fully complement symmetric 'event' if and only if is a SEU ordering.
This result applies to the CEU model of Schmeidler [20] and to the MEU model of Gilboa and Schmeidler [13] . However, we do not think that it raises any serious concerns as to the possibility of those models of generally describing ambiguity averse decision makers. The reason is that, as hinted above, in this setting the existence of a fully complement symmetric 'event' does not seem as mild an assumption as the existence of a complement symmetric A ∈ Σ in the Savage setting. What magnified the power of the latter assumption in the results in the previous sections were the additional range convexity assumptions, which are naturally provided by certain axiomatic structures. In contrast, the existence of a fully complement symmetric 'event' incorporates the consequences of range convexity that are needed for the results (and this is why it does not need additional range convexity assumptions). This difference makes it a much less plausible assumption from a descriptive point of view. 
Appendix
A Capacities and Choquet integrals
A capacity ρ is called balanced if Core(ρ) is nonempty; it is called exact if it is balanced and ρ(A)
Convex capacities are exact, and exact capacities are balanced, but the converses are not true. Given a class Λ ⊆ Σ closed with respect to complements, a capacity ρ :
The notion of integral used for capacities is that due to Choquet [4] . The Choquet integral of a non-negative measurable function ϕ : S → R w.r.t. ρ is defined as follows:
where the integral is taken in the sense of Riemann (they are well-defined because ρ is monotone). When ρ is a probability measure, Choquet and Lebesgue integrals are equal.
B CEU and MEU orderings
B.1 CEU orderings
In the Savage setting, a binary relation on F is called a CEU ordering if there exist a utility function u : X → R and a capacity ρ on Σ such that the decision maker's preferences are represented by the Choquet integral of u with respect to ρ (see Appendix A for the definitions). That is, is represented by V : F → R defined as follows
In the Anscombe-Aumann setting, is a CEU ordering if the V functional satisfies (15) and is also affine on P . In either setting, a SEU ordering is a CEU ordering whose ρ is a probability measure.
Clearly, a nontrivial CEU ordering is biseparable, with canonical representation given by V (Choquet integrals are easily seen to satisfy monotonicity). In the Anscombe-Aumann setting, a CEU ordering is also c-linear biseparable.
B.2 α-MEU orderings
In the Savage setting, a binary relation on F is called an α-MEU ordering if the following hold: There are a utility function u : X → R, a (weak * -) closed and convex set of probabilities C on (S , Σ), and a coefficient α ∈ [0, 1] such that is represented by the functional V : F → R given by
When α = 1, we call a MEU ordering. In an Anscombe-Aumann setting, is an α-MEU ordering if the V functional satisfies (16) and is affine on P . In either setting, a SEU ordering is a α-MEU ordering which has C = {P }.
A nontrivial α-MEU ordering is biseparable, with canonical representation V , and
where P (·) ≡ min P ∈C P (·) and P (·) ≡ max P ∈C P (·). The set-function P is seen to be an exact capacity. In the Anscombe-Aumann setting, a α-MEU ordering is also c-linear biseparable.
C Proofs
The following easy lemma is used in the proofs of Propositions 1 and 4, and it has some independent interest.
Lemma 2 A symmetric capacity ρ on (S , Σ) is balanced (i.e., Core(ρ) / = ∅) if and only if it is a probability measure.
Proof. Let P ∈ Core(ρ). We have:
This implies that ρ is additive. 
In particular, since ρ is convex-ranged on Λ, there is some B 0 ∈ Λ, such that ρ(B 0 ) = ρ(A), so that we obtain
where the last equality follows from the fact that ρ is symmetric on Λ. This shows that ρ is symmetric on Σ.
As for (iii ), it follows immediately from the fact that ρ is symmetric and Lemma 2. Hence, for every B ∼ * A, P (B ) = α for all P ∈ Core(ρ). We now show that, conversely, if for B ∈ Σ there is P ∈ Core(ρ) such that P (B ) = α, then B ∼ * A. For every P ∈ Core(ρ) and every C ∈ Σ, ρ(C ) ≤ P (C ) ≤ρ(C ) (whereρ is the complementary capacity of ρ defined by:
If equality holds, we are done. Otherwise, suppose that ρ(B ) < α. By (9),ρ(B ) <ρ(A) = α. But then P (B ) < α, and we get a contradiction.
We thus conclude that for every P ∈ Core(ρ) and every B ∈ Σ,
Since ρ is convex-ranged on Λ, we can find a chain {C β } β∈ [0, 1] ⊆ Λ such that ρ(C β ) = β for all β ∈ [0, 1]. Let Σ 0 be the algebra generated by the chain {C β }. We want to show that each P ∈ Core(ρ) is strongly continuous on Σ 0 . That is, for every ε > 0 one can find a finite partition
Proceeding in this way, we can construct a finite partition {B i } n i =1 ⊆ Σ 0 such that 0 < P (B i ) ≤ ε for all i , where n is the smallest positive integer such that ε ≥ 1/n. This proves our claim that that each P ∈ Core(ρ) is strongly continuous on Σ 0 . Since Σ 0 ⊆ Σ, each P ∈ Core(ρ) is strongly continuous on Σ, hence (by a classical result of Savage [19] ) convex-ranged on Σ.
For all P , P ∈ Core(ρ), (18) implies that, for all B ∈ Σ,
By Lemma 1, we thus have P = P . This clearly implies that Core(ρ) = {P }. The proof of (ii ) then follows immediately: If ρ is exact, then ρ = P .
Proof of Corollary 1. From Theorem 1 it follows that ρ is additive, so that Core(ρ) = {ρ}. By ambiguity aversion D ( ) / = ∅, and since it is immediate that Core(ρ) ⊇ D ( ), we have that D ( ) = {ρ}. Hence, using Eq. (11) we get that for every f ∈ F S u(f (s)) ρ(ds) = V (f ), which proves that has a SEU representation with utility u and probability ρ. The converse is immediate.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Since A ∈ Π( ), (10) implies that if ρ(B ) = ρ(A), then ρ(B ) + ρ(B c ) = 1. We proceed as in the proof of Theorem 1, to show that (18) holds for every P ∈ Core(ρ) and every B ∈ Σ.
Also, since ρ is convex-ranged, we reason as in that proof to show that there exists a chain {C β } such that ρ(C β ) = β for all β ∈ [0, 1]. As ρ is convex, there exists a P ∈ Core(ρ) such that P (C β ) = ρ(C β ) = β for all β ∈ [0, 1] (see Delbaen [6] ). Let Σ 0 be the algebra generated by the chain {C β }. Yet again, we follow the previous argument to show that P is strongly continuous on Σ 0 , and so on Σ as well. Hence, P is convex-ranged on Σ. Hence, we know that every measure in the core is convex-ranged, and that for all P , P ∈ Core(ρ), we have P (A) = α ⇐⇒ P (A) = α so that, again by Lemma 1, P = P . Hence, Core(ρ) = {P }. Since ρ is convex, ρ = P .
The following lemma is used in the proof of Proposition 3.
Lemma 3
Suppose that is an α-MEU preference, with α / = 1/2. Then for every A ∈ Π( ), P (A) = P (A) for all P , P ∈ C .
Proof. Using the definition of ρ in Eq. (17) and the fact that A ∈ Π( ), we obtain α P (A) + (1 − α) P (A) + α P (A c ) + (1 − α) P (A c ) = 1.
If we now use the identity P (A c ) = 1 − P (A), we can rewrite the equation above as follows: α (P (A) − P (A)) = (1 − α)(P (A) − P (A)).
When α / = 1/2, this can only hold if P (A) = P (A), i.e., P (A) = P (A) for all P , P ∈ C , concluding the proof of the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let A ∈ Π( ) be essential and complement symmetric, and let γ = P (A) = P (A). Let P ∈ C and B ∈ Σ be such that P (B ) = γ. Then P (B ) ≤ γ. We show that, actually, P (B ) = γ. Suppose not. Then, by (9) , P (B c ) > 1−γ, so that P (B ) < γ, which contradicts P (B ) = γ. Hence, P (B ) = γ. In turn, this and Eq. (10) implies min P (B c ) = 1 − γ, and so P (B ) = γ for all P ∈ C . Since P was arbitrary, we conclude that for all B ∈ Σ, P (B ) = γ if and only if P (B ) = γ for all P , P ∈ C .
Consider now the convex-ranged measure P 0 ∈ C . We have that for every B ∈ Σ and every P ∈ C , P (B ) = γ iff P 0 (B ) = γ. Lemma 1 then shows that P = P 0 , as wanted.
Proof of Proposition 4.
To prove the 'only if' of the first statement, we rewrite (12) and (13) 
